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THE MODERN-DAY IMPACT OF CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY: 
"MANAGING FAMILY JUSTICE IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES"* 
 
C Rautenbach** 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The modern-day impact of cultural and religious diversity comes to the fore in a 
recent publication by Hart Publishing, viz. "Managing Family Justice in Diverse 
Societies" (hereafter "Managing Family Justice"). The "management" of family 
justice in diverse cultural and religious societies remains a highly topical and vibrant 
theme. Formerly homogenous societies are increasingly diversifying as a result of 
globalisation, especially in Europe, where governments are progressively faced with 
the challenges migrant cultural and religious groups pose to existing legal 
frameworks. Contrariwise, to assume that historically diverse communities know all 
the answers because of their exposure to cultural and religious differences over a 
longer period of time is a misconception. 
 
The failure of many governments to effectively "manage" family justice in diverse 
societies is testament to the fact that existing policies and legal frameworks do not 
necessarily work. There is no one size that fits all, and it is necessary to explore 
"what response the law has or should have to different family practices arising from 
cultural and religious beliefs" by discussing "management" strategies from a legal 
viewpoint in various jurisdictions.1 This is indeed what the authors of Managing 
Family Justice purport to do. They discuss various scenarios of family diversity in a 
number of jurisdictions such as Israel, South Africa, England, Spain, Poland, France, 
Wales, Botswana, Iran and Bangladesh. There is no apparent link between the 
                                        
*  This note is a commentary on some of the viewpoints discussed in Maclean and Eekelaar (eds) 
Managing Family Justice in Diverse Societies. See also the book review by Rautenbach 2013(16)5 
PER 478-487. 
**  Christa Rautenbach. BIuris (cum laude) LLB (cum laude) LLM LLD (PU for CHE). Professor of law, 
Faculty of Law, North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus), South Africa. Email: 
christa.rautenbach@nwu.ac.za. 
1  Maclean and Eekelaar Managing Family Diversity preface. 
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jurisdictions discussed besides the fact that they are all more or less confronted with 
the challenges family diversity brings to the fore, especially within a socio-legal 
context. A reader looking for solutions and strategies to "manage" family diversity 
will, however, be disappointed. As explained by the editors,2 the contributions in the 
book are a collection of studies intended to contribute to academic debate, which 
certainly also forms part of the general democratic debate, and the discussions are 
relevant at least for that reason. 
 
Having said this, it would have been helpful if the editors had conceptualised some 
of the terms associated with their debates, especially those appearing in the title of 
the book, namely "family justice", "managing" and "diverse societies", because of 
their fluidity and the contestation surrounding their meanings. The term "manage", 
for example, is usually applied in a business setting, whilst the term "regulation" is 
typically used to describe the operation of the law, and the term "governance" to 
describe what governments do. Nevertheless, the absence of a proper consideration 
of such words and ideas does not detract from the message the editors wish to 
convey, namely that the approaches to family diversity are equally diverse; thus 
demanding an understanding of those differences which can be obtained only 
through publications such as this. 
 
This note is a commentary on the viewpoints put forward by some of the authors in 
Managing Family Justice. Wherever possible or even necessary, parallels are drawn 
between the contents of the relevant chapter and situations elsewhere, especially in 
South Africa. 
 
2 Theories, ideologies and strategies 
 
Theories and ideologies undoubtedly play an important role in one's approach to 
family diversity and its "management". Scholars have different ideas and views on 
how “management” should be performed, which illustrates that one's own 
                                        
2  Maclean and Eekelaar "Introduction" 2. 
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upbringing and context definitely plays an important role in deciding what the best 
approach should be. It is therefore no surprise that authors proposes a variety of 
approaches. 
 
2.1 Non-involvement of state laws 
 
John Eekelaar3 cautions against the clothing of family norms with the force of law, 
for a number of reasons. For one, families are groups within which power structures 
exist which are not and should not be regulated by state laws. In addition, laws 
cannot or should not cater for the nuances in personal relationships, and neither 
should they impose dominant ideologies upon the personal lives of individuals. He 
refers to three models of state regulation of family behaviour, viz. the 
"authorisation" model, the "delegation" model and the "purposive abstention" model. 
The model he prefers is one of "purposive abstention", which means that "moral and 
social obligations within families are not normally given the force of law unless their 
failure threatens community interests, or to achieve justice when families fall apart".4 
However, the law of the state would always be relevant and applicable and would 
nonetheless thus influence family behaviour. 
 
At first glance, it comes as a bit of a surprise that he discusses a fourth model for 
regulation to which he did not refer in his introduction, viz. "cultural voluntarism". 
Upon closer inspection it appears that purposive abstention and cultural voluntarism 
are interlinked and dependent on each other. Cultural voluntarism allows for a 
certain measure of group autonomy on a voluntary basis. In this scenario the state 
stands back and allows individuals within groups considerable freedom to follow 
their own practices within the private (family) sphere. It thus seems that the 
purposive model and cultural voluntarism go hand in hand. The only problem with 
this contention is that it is based on the assumption that group activities are always 
voluntary and subject to the will of the individual in the group. Although this may be 
generally true within Western contexts, it is debatable whether it always is the 
                                        
3  Eekelaar "Law and Community Practices" 15-31. 
4  Eekelaar "Law and Community Practices" 16-17. 
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situation. One of the dynamics of African societies, for example, is the role an 
individual plays within the social structure, which often comes to the fore in the 
concept uBuntu.5 The concept in essence refers to group solidarity and the role of 
the individual within this group. As the survival of the group is dependent on the 
conduct of the individual, anti-group conduct will generally not be tolerated. Seen 
this way, the choices of the individual mostly have to give way to social pressure 
from the group within which he or she operates and "cultural voluntariness", as the 
author puts it, becomes questionable. A recent case in point saw the banning of 
women wearing trousers, and thus contravening the local customs of Swaziland, 
from participating in the local elections.6 
 
I thus have to agree with the critique of Eekelaar's Eurocentric approach as voiced 
by Prakash Shah.7 According to him, Eekelaar's preference for the "purposive 
abstention" vis-à-vis the "cultural voluntarism" model is reflective of the status quo 
in many jurisdictions. Such a viewpoint gives no recognition to the fact that cultural 
differences are in need of legal protection and recognition, and also blatantly ignores 
social realities in Europe and elsewhere. 
 
2.2 Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
The idea that family justice should remain within the personal sphere through the 
application of Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms, referred to as Religious 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (RADR), is explored by Farrah Ahmed.8 By RADR she 
means "arbitration, mediation or reconciliation in accordance with religious norms, 
agreed to by the parties in a contract and recognised and (if appropriate) enforced 
                                        
5  Mokgoro 1998 PER 16-32. 
6  Swazi Media Commentary 2013 http://allafrica.com/stories/201308061076.html. Similar incidents 
occurred in Malawi (News24 2012 http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Malawi-women-to-
protest-trouser-stripping-gang-20120119 and South Africa (BBC News/Africa date unknown 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6917332.stm). See also the concerns raised by Bano "Muslim 
Dispute Resolution in Britain" 82-84. 
7  Shah "Shadow Boxing with Community Practices" 49-60. 
8  Ahmed "Religious Norms in Family Law" 33-48. 
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by the state".9 She challenges the idea that group autonomy necessarily restricts 
individual autonomy and argues that RADR holds the potential of enhancing 
individual autonomy, because it protects an individual's freedom of religion and may 
even provide opportunities for an individual to influence the decision of the RADR 
body. 
 
In addition, she contends that the fact that RADR allows group norms and leaders to 
be chosen and developed by the groups means that RADR holds the potential of 
enhancing personal autonomy because individuals would have greater political 
influence over the doings of the RADR bodies. There are, however, no guarantees 
that the position of some marginalised groups, such as women, would be protected 
within RADR without state intervention. Considering that in many cases religious 
institutions are headed by males, that many of the religious rules are not favourable 
to women, that it would probably not be permissible to opt out10 of RADR, and that 
in many jurisdictions review procedures to evaluate the decisions of the religious 
institutions do not exist, it is doubtful that family justice would exist for all.11 
 
In a similar vein, Samia Bano12 discusses RADR in the context of family law. She 
points out there are many unofficial Muslim bodies applying Muslim family law in 
Britain.13 These bodies are neither unified nor do they represent a specific school of 
thought, and their orders are binding only inter partes.14 
 
Her discussion of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal established in Britain in 2007 in 
terms of the Arbitration Act of 1996 captures the concerns I have about the RADR 
mechanisms discussed by Ahmed above. The tribunal operates within the legal 
framework of England and Wales,15 which means that its orders can be enforced like 
                                        
9  Ahmed "Religious Norms in Family Law" 34. 
10  See also the comment made by Shah "Shadow Boxing with Community Practices" 55 regarding 
the dilemma of "one party 'wanting in' while the other objects". 
11  See for example the discussion of Gabru 2004 PER 43-56. 
12  Bano "Muslim Dispute Resolution in Britain" 61-86. 
13  Bano "Muslim Dispute Resolution in Britain" 65-69. 
14  A similar situation exists in South Africa. See Rautenbach 2004 PER 96. 
15  The official website of the tribunal is http://matribunal.com/index.html. 
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any other order of an arbitration tribunal in Britain. Although the procedural rules are 
prescribed by state laws, the parties will be able to settle their disputes in terms of 
Muslim law. This is thus a good example of where state law can be used to ensure 
the application of Muslim law in certain family disputes. Bano refers to the 
introduction of the Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill which is 
currently being debated in the British parliament.16 The purpose of the Bill is to 
extend equality legislation to the operation of arbitration and mediation services, and 
it is widely believed that its intention is to target services based on Muslim law. 
Bano's research reveals that the relationship between Muslim women and some of 
these tribunals (the unofficial ones and the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal) remains 
complex and she cautions against the unabridged accommodation of religious laws 
through these institutions within the British legal system without more research. 
 
As far as I am aware, Muslim institutions in South Africa have not yet considered 
using arbitration as a mechanism for family or other Muslim-related disputes. It is 
also doubtful that it could be done. The Arbitration Act17 prevents the arbitration of 
"any matrimonial cause or any matter incidental to any such cause"18 or "any matter 
relating to status".19 In the light of the fact that most family disputes involve either 
matrimonial causes or the status of a family member or a marriage, the Act would in 
all probability not be helpful in mediating family matters. 
 
3 Interaction between religious and secular norms 
 
In many jurisdictions the regulation of religious and secular norms in diverse 
societies is often one of the most difficult things to do. In addition, societies are not 
divorced from one another and the interaction between religious and secular norms 
warrants careful consideration by state institutions. 
 
                                        
16  Bano "Muslim Dispute Resolution in Britain" 73-76. 
17  Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. 
18  See s 2(a) of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. 
19  See s 2(b) of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. 
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3.1 Legislative responses to cultural diversity 
 
Pascale Fournier, Pascal McDougall and Merissa Lichtsztral describe the situation 
where a Jewish husband keeps his wife chained to him by refusing to grant her a 
religious divorce (the get).20 In order to prevent this from happening, Israel enacted 
the 1995 Rabbinical Courts Law (Enforcement of Divorce Judgments) 5755-1995 
which grants rabbinical courts the power to adjudicate Jewish divorces by issuing 
certain sanctions compelling the husband to issue the get to his wife. Sanctions 
would include the prevention of a husband from travelling abroad, the refusal to 
issue the husband with a driving licence or passport, or even the imprisonment of 
the husband until he issues a get releasing his wife.21 Their research demonstrates 
that, although the application of this legislation has been inconsistent and fuzzy, it 
has given women considerably more bargaining powers in the negotiation process to 
obtain a divorce.22 
 
An interesting parallel can be drawn between the legal position in Israel and that in 
South Africa. As a result of the occurrence of similar scenarios, where a husband 
refused to give his wife a gets after obtaining a divorce in a secular court in terms of 
the Divorce Act,23 the Act was amended to include a provision that empowers the 
court to refuse to grant an order of divorce. Section 5A24 of the Divorce Act allows 
the South African courts to prevent a Jewish husband from gaining a secular divorce 
                                        
20  Fournier, McDougall and Lichtsztral "A 'Deviant' Solution" 89-105. 
21  Fournier, McDougall and Lichtsztral "A 'Deviant' Solution" 92-93. 
22  Fournier, McDougall and Lichtsztral "A 'Deviant' Solution" 91-100. 
23  Divorce Act 70 of 1979. The amendment to the Divorce Act followed recommendations made by 
the South African Law Commission (SALC Project 76). 
24  This section provides: "If it appears to a court in divorce proceedings that despite the granting of 
a decree of divorce by the court the spouses or either one of them will, by reason of the 
prescripts of their religion or the religion of either one of them, not be free to remarry unless the 
marriage is also dissolved in accordance with such prescripts or unless a barrier to the 
remarriage of the spouse concerned is removed, the court may refuse to grant a decree of 
divorce unless the court is satisfied that the spouse within whose power it is to have the 
marriage so dissolved or the said barrier so removed, has taken all the necessary steps to have 
the marriage so dissolved or the barrier to the remarriage of the other spouse removed or the 
court may make any other order that it finds just." 
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without also providing a woman with a religious divorce.25 This is meant to ensure 
that a woman will automatically be granted a get by her husband, if a secular 
divorce is granted. This, of course, can also lead to inequity if the man refuses to 
grant a religious divorce, as this would then prevent a secular divorce as well, and it 
also does not provide for the situation where the couple was married in terms of 
religious rites. 
 
Waheeda Amien26 argues in favour of legislative recognition for Muslim family law in 
South Africa. She argues convincingly that the current unrecognised status of Muslim 
marriages is not favourable to women because their marriages fall outside the realm 
of the mainstream legal systems in South Africa (the common and the customary 
law). 
 
She continues to discuss two Bills in various stages of evolution that hold the 
potential of catering for the future recognition of Muslim marriages. The first one, 
namely the "Muslim Marriages Bill", was introduced into cabinet and published for 
comments in 2011 but does not, according to Amien, satisfy the needs of Muslims in 
their entirety.27 
 
The second one is a joint effort of the Commission for Gender Equality and the State 
Law Advisor's Office and is referred to as the "Recognition of Religious Marriages 
Bill". The Bill is fairly unknown and has not yet reached the stage where public 
participation has been invited. Amien contends that the absence of the regulation of 
certain aspects of Muslim family law in the Bill opens the possibility for the Muslim 
community to continue regulating their own family law in a discriminatory manner. 
She argues in favour of the legislative regulation of Muslim family law but cautions 
                                        
25  In Amar v Amar 1999 3 SA 604 (W), Goldstein J ordered a husband to pay a set monthly amount 
of maintenance until he gave his wife a get. See the discussion of Bilchitz "Jewish Law" 290-291. 
See also Blackbeard 1994 THRHR 641-647. 
26  Amien "Gendered Benefits and Costs" 107-123. 
27  Amien "Gendered Benefits and Costs" 117. 
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against a mere codification of discriminatory Muslim rules and asks that codification 
must be done within a human rights framework.28 
 
Amien's discussion does not deal with the question of who is a "Muslim" in terms of 
the Muslim Marriages Bill. Clause 1 of the Muslim Marriages Bill defines a "Muslim" 
as "a person who believes in the oneness of Allah and who believes in the Holy 
Messenger Muhammad as the final prophet and who has faith in all the essentials of 
Islam (Daruriyyat Al-Din"). It does not take an expert to foresee an array of 
problems with this definition, especially when a court that prefers not be entangled 
in dogmatic questions needs to determine whether or not a person's belief is 
genuine. In Prince v President, Cape Law Society29 Justice Ngcobo, who delivered 
the minority judgment, refers to this dilemma as follows:30 
 
... the Court should not be concerned with questions whether, as a matter of 
religious doctrine, a particular practice is central to the religion. Religion is a matter 
of faith and belief. The beliefs that believers hold sacred and thus central to their 
religious faith may strike non-believers as bizarre, illogical or irrational. Human 
beings may freely believe in what they cannot prove. Yet, that their beliefs are 
bizarre, illogical or irrational to others or are incapable of scientific proof, does not 
detract from the fact that these are religious beliefs for the purposes of enjoying 
the protection guaranteed by the right to freedom of religion. The believers should 
not be put to the proof of their beliefs or faith. For this reason, it is undesirable for 
courts to enter into the debate whether a particular practice is central to a religion 
unless there is a genuine dispute as to the centrality of the practice. 
 
Nevertheless, the problem of definition is not unique to religious marriages. The fact 
that there are nowadays a number of statutes regulating different types of 
marriages in South Africa requires the application of certain conflict or choice of law 
rules to determine which statute is relevant to a given situation.31 Although the 
application of the rules is not problem free, this should not hamper future 
                                        
28  Amien "Gendered Benefits and Costs" 122. 
29  Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 2 SA 794 (CC). 
30  Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 2 SA 794 (CC) para 42. Emphasis added. See also 
Rautenbach "Umkhosi Ukweshwama" 63-89 for a discussion of the legal significance of the 
meaning of religion and culture. 
31  The following marriage laws are currently in operation: Marriage Act 25 of 1961 (monogamous 
civil marriage); Recognition of Customary Marriage Act 120 of 1998 (monogamous or 
polygamous customary marriage); and Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (monogamous same- or 
opposite sex partners). 
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developments in South African marriage laws but must be duly regarded in the 
drafting of future legislation. 
 
Another controversial issue is the constitutionality of the Muslim Marriages Bill. Some 
authors have argued that some of its provisions are manifestly unconstitutional, 
either directly or indirectly in respect of human rights violations.32 Amien does not 
deal with the question of the constitutionality of the Muslim Marriages Bill directly, 
but she does discuss a few examples where the Bill does not promote women's right 
to equality to the full extent. She points out that the Bill continuously refers the two 
primary sources (Qur'an and Sunnah) as guiding principles in the interpretation of 
the provisions of the Bill, a fact which has the potential to disadvantage women.33 
She prefers that the guiding principles for the Bill's interpretation be found in South 
Africa's constitutional and international law obligations, and expresses the hope that 
a secular judiciary will take those, rather than the obligations in terms of Islamic law, 
into consideration when interpreting the Muslim Marriages Bill.34 Her 
recommendation does not, however, solve the issue of the non-entanglement with 
dogmatic issues by a secular judiciary. Irrespective of where the judges find their 
guiding principles (Islamic law, constitutional law or international law) it will be 
required that they interpret a statute based on Islamic values and principles, which 
will inevitably entail the need for them to grapple with dogmatic questions. 
 
Mavis MacLean35 examines the impact of a statute aimed at the prevention of forced 
marriages in the United Kingdom, especially where custom or religion allows for such 
practices to be performed. To her surprise and the surprise of many others, the 
provisions of the Act have been invoked much more often than initially suspected, 
and have been instrumental in the protection of many young people against human 
rights abuses.36 She also discusses future legalisation to criminalise forced marriages 
                                        
32  See for example, Neels 2012 TSAR 486-506 and Neels 2013 TSAR 396-397. 
33  See also Moosa Unveiling the Mind 13-14, which discusses the inherent unequal nature of the 
primary sources. 
34  Amien "Gendered Benefits and Costs" 113-114. 
35  Maclean "Assessing the Impact of Legislating for Diversity" 125-136. 
36  Maclean "Assessing the Impact of Legislating for Diversity" 134. 
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and warns that such steps must be taken with caution, because they could easily 
backfire and negate the good effect the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 
has had thus far. 
 
3.2 Responses to conflicting rights and freedoms 
 
Time and again two opposing central forces are irreconcilably opposed within the 
context of human rights. These conflicting interests hold the potential of causing a 
tug-of-war between rights and values in human rights discourses. One conflict that 
comes to mind is the right to equality on the one hand and to cultural and religion-
based rights on the other. These are two categories of rights which are often 
incompatible, especially in the case of cultural practices that violate women's rights. 
Teresa Picontó-Novales37 discusses another well-known situation where someone's 
life, especially that of a minor, is threatened because in the particular scenario she 
discusses the religious principles of the Jehovah Witnesses prohibit a blood 
transfusion.38 The author makes it clear that the conflict between apparent self-
same values and rights such as the right of individuals to exercise their rights and 
freedoms as they please, the right to life and health, and children's rights, on the 
one hand, and cultural and religious rights and parental rights on the other, is not 
easily resolved. 
 
In this particular case the boy died because of his and his parents’ refusal to allow a 
blood transfusion to save his life. The parents were subsequently prosecuted for the 
offence of homicide by omission but the different opinions reached in the three 
judicial decisions that followed are a clear indication of the difficulties of the case. 
Although the constitutional court eventually found that the parents were not guilty, 
the author is of the opinion that the state authority's sensitive response to the 
religious beliefs of the family contributed to the eventual demise of the young boy, 
                                        
37  Picontó-Novales "Religious Freedom" 137-151. 
38  Similar situations exist in South Africa. See for example, Foss 2009 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/court-saves-jehovah-s-witness-girl-s-life-
1.435180#.Ugt1gp0aIlY. 
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which could have been prevented if it had intervened at a much earlier stage.39 The 
crux of the matter has been described by former Justice Sachs of the South African 
Constitutional Court as follows:40 
 
The underlying problem in any open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom in which conscientious and religious freedom has to 
be regarded with appropriate seriousness, is how far such democracy can and must 
go in allowing members of religious communities to define for themselves which 
laws they will obey and which not. Such a society can cohere only if all its 
participants accept that certain basic norms and standards are binding. Accordingly, 
believers cannot claim an automatic right to be exempted by their beliefs from the 
laws of the land. At the same time, the State should, wherever reasonably possible, 
seek to avoid putting believers to extremely painful and intensely burdensome 
choices of either being true to their faith or else respectful of the law. 
 
If, however, making a choice cannot be prevented, the rights of children are 
paramount over other rights and freedoms, and - 
 
... [w]hereas parents are free to choose and practise the religion of their choice, 
such activities can and must be restricted when they are against the child's best 
interests, without thereby infringing the parents' freedom of religion.41 
 
It is also interesting to note that murder or culpable homicide are both crimes in 
South African law and that an omission leading to the death of someone might also 
be enough to lead to the conviction of the omissor.42 It would be interesting to see if 
the so-called "cultural defence" could be raised as a defence against a conviction of 
murder or culpable homicide where the motivation for the crime was based on 
cultural or religious grounds in a criminal law context.43 
 
Jacek Kurczewski and Malgorzata Fuszara44 discuss the conflict situations where 
state laws prescribe a certain age for marriage and sexual intercourse whilst certain 
Roma traditions allow for marriage and intercourse at a much younger age. Their 
                                        
39  Picontó-Novales "Religious Freedom" 149-150. 
40  Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) para 35. 
41  Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) para 41. 
42  Under certain circumstances the omission is enough to constitute action by the commission of a 
crime. Kemp et al Criminal Law 44. 
43  See the discussion of Rautenbach and Matthee 2010 J Legal Plur 109-144. 
44  Kurczewski and Fuszara "Cultural Norms, National Laws and Human Rights" 153-168. 
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discussion reminds one of the 50-year-old Aboriginal man, Jackie Pascoe Jamilmira, 
who was initially sentenced to 13 months’ imprisonment by a magistrate in 
Maningrida in the Northern Territory of Australia on a charge of statutory rape . The 
sentence was later reduced to 24 hours but again increased to 12 months after a 
public outcry, and the facts of the case are indicative of the issues involved where 
state laws and cultural practices are in direct conflict with each other.45 
 
The authors also discuss another practice, namely "elopement", which resembles a 
"fake kidnapping" to escape the consequences of an arranged marriage by the 
parents.46 The practice brings to mind a similar practice in African customary law, 
namely the ukuthwala custom. In terms of this custom a girl is "abducted" by the 
prospective husband, his family or his friends with the purpose of the man’s 
marrying her. The custom has led to convictions of abduction, rape and assault in 
some criminal cases and remains a controversial topic in South African law. Research 
has shown that the practice has also been abused to force young girls to marry older 
men, and it is currently under investigation by the South African Law Reform 
Commission.47 
 
Yasmine Debarge and Benoit Bastard48 evaluate the situation in France, where 
historical developments have led to a total aversion against anything (culturally) 
different. They explain that the Child Access Services is a welfare service operating 
in a secular state intended to re-establish the relationship between a parent and a 
child. However, most of the people serviced by these services are from families with 
different cultural and religious backgrounds, which complicates the parent-child 
bonding process, especially when culture and religion are ignored. 
 
                                        
45  See the discussion of Rautenbach and Matthee 2010 J Legal Plur 109-110. 
46  Kurczewski and Fuszara "Cultural Norms, National Laws and Human Rights" 157-160. 
47  For an overview of this custom, see Rautenbach and Matthee 2010 J Legal Plur 118-126. 
48  Debarge and Bastard "Child Access Services in France" 169-182. 
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3.3 Non-state responses to cultural diversity 
 
In addition to or apart from governmental actions to "manage" diverse societies, 
other non-state mechanisms have developed to respond to such demands as 
diversity brings to the fore. 
 
The first example is the development of religious tribunals assuming a quasi-judicial 
role within religious communities. Four authors from England and Wales49 conducted 
empirical research into the doings of three unofficial religious tribunals (a Shariah 
council, a Jewish Beth Din and a Catholic tribunal) and came to the conclusion that 
such tribunals generally do not have a problem with being unrecognised by the 
states because they understand and accept the demarcation between religious and 
secular authority. The authors see their existence and operation outside the 
mainstream legal system as "no more than a passive tolerance of religious practice 
undertaken without expectation of state recognition".50 As a result of the differences 
between English law and religious laws, they also do not foresee the future 
recognition of any of these tribunals. The argument of the authors is weakened by 
the fact, acknowledged by themselves, that only the views of the religious 
institutions were obtained and not those of the people served by them. Although on 
another level, their viewpoint is thus similar to that implicit in the model of 
"purposive abstention/cultural voluntarism" put forward by Eekelaar above. I have 
already indicated my criticism of such a viewpoint and also of the opinions of Shah, 
above. In addition, Amien51 argues that proper protection can be afforded to women 
only if the recognition of religious rules and norms takes place within a human rights 
framework. 
 
One example of a quasi-judicial tribunal tasked with the regulation of Muslim affairs 
in South Africa is the Muslim Judicial Council. The council was established in 1945 as 
a non-profit organisation that makes declarations on matters pertaining to Muslim 
                                        
49  Douglas et al "Accommodating Religious Divorce" 185-201. 
50  Douglas et al "Accommodating Religious Divorce" 198. 
51  Amien "Gendered Benefits and Costs" 122. 
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law, including marriage and divorce.52 Its pronouncements are generally accepted by 
the Muslim community, although it is binding only inter partes based on the 
conscience of the community. The decisions of organisations such as these often do 
not favour women. 
 
The facts of a recent unreported case of the Western Cape High Court, Faro v 
Bingham,53 may serve as example. The applicant in this case, Tarryn Faro, had been 
in a cohabitation-relationship with the late Moosa Ely (the "deceased") since 2006. 
The deceased had an adult son and daughter from a previous marriage. The first 
child of Tarryn and the deceased was born during 2007. On March 2008 they 
married in accordance with Muslim rites but their marriage was never legalised in 
terms of South African law. During 2009 the deceased became terminally ill and one 
day, after an argument, he obtained a Talãq (a letter of divorce) from the local 
Imam without Tarryn's knowledge. She was seven months pregnant when this 
happened, and their child was born on 26 October 2009 resulting in the expiration of 
the Iddah-period.54 However, according to Tarryn their divorce was revoked because 
she and the deceased resumed intimacy after the birth of the child. After the death 
of the deceased, Tarryn was appointed as the executrix of his estate. Without the 
knowledge of Tarryn, the deceased's adult daughter obtained an annulment 
certificate from the Muslim Judicial Council, which she submitted to the Master of the 
High Court. What followed then was first a letter from the council that she was 
indeed the wife of the deceased, followed by another letter withdrawing the previous 
one and confirming that the Talãq was valid. In addition, Tarryn and her children 
were thrown out of the family home and she had to live on the streets in shelters, 
whilst her two minor children were taken into state care. Another meeting ensued 
between the deceased's daughter and the council without Tarryn's knowledge 
resulted in the issuing of a certificate by the council stating that there had been no 
reconciliation between Tarryn and the deceased, and again that the Talãq was valid. 
                                        
52  The official website of the council is accessible at http://www.mjc.org.za/. 
53  Faro v Bingham (WCHC) unreported case number 4466/13 of 25 October 2013. 
54  Muslim law imposes a waiting period on women whose marriage has been terminated by divorce 
unless she is pregnant, in which case the period expires when the child is born. See Goolam, 
Badat and Moosa "Muslim Law of Marriage" 304. 
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On account of this, Tarryn was removed as executrix and the deceased's daughter 
was appointed in her place. Tarryn challenged the decision of the master in the 
Western High Court and sought relief which was to take the form, amongst others 
things, of a declaration that she was indeed married in terms of Muslim law and that 
she was a spouse in terms of the Intestate Succession Act 55and a survivor in terms 
of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act.56 Based on the evidence before it, the 
court was satisfied that the marriage between Tarryn and the deceased was still in 
existence when he died and that she was to be regarded as his surviving spouse. 
She was accordingly reinstated as executrix and the daughter of the deceased was 
removed as such.57 However, Tarryn's claim that their marriage be declared valid in 
terms of the Marriage Act,58 alternatively, that the common law definition be 
extended to include Muslim marriages, was postponed for hearing at a later date.59 
Although the matter has not reached conclusion, three important observations can 
be made. First of all, the court verified that the Muslim Judicial Council "has no 
statutory or religious authority finally to determine questions as to whether a 
marriage has been validly concluded or dissolved in accordance with the tenets of 
Islam".60 Secondly, the master is not bound by the pronouncements of the Muslim 
Judicial Council and must adjudicate matters such as this by looking at the factual 
evidence placed before her. She cannot base her decision merely on letters issued 
by the council.61 Thirdly, the court lambasted a government department for not 
making any progress on the enactment of legislation recognising the validity of 
Muslim marriages. It ordered the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development to set out the progress it has made in respect of the enactment of the 
Muslim Marriages Bill of 2011 no later than 15 July 2014.62 
 
                                        
55  Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. 
56  Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. 
57  Faro v Bingham (WCHC) unreported case number 4466/13 of 25 October 2013 para 47. 
58  Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
59  The application for the declaration of validity was postponed to 20 August 2014. Faro v Bingham 
(WCHC) unreported case number 4466/13 of 25 October 2013 para 47(c)(i). 
60  Faro v Bingham (WCHC) unreported case number 4466/13 of 25 October 2013 para 34. 
61  Faro v Bingham (WCHC) unreported case number 4466/13 of 25 October 2013 para 34-35. 
62  Faro v Bingham (WCHC) unreported case number 4466/13 of 25 October 2013 para 47(c)(ii). 
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Although the decision of the court is to be welcomed in the light of the protection it 
afforded to Tarryn, it is envisaged that the comments of the court regarding the 
status of the Muslim Judicial Council will not go down well with the council and the 
conservative members of the Muslim community who regard themselves bound by 
its decisions. 
 
Also dealing with the issue of religious marriages, Jagbir Jhutti-Johal63 explains how 
modernity has influenced the development of cultural practices within the Sikh 
community, especially when a marriage breaks down and issues of mediation and 
divorce come to the fore. Although certain religions and cultures show resilience 
against change, the Sikh community has realised that change is inevitable. They are 
therefore applying a parallel system where they try to mend the broken marriage 
first through family mediation and, if that does not succeed, they permit the couple 
to obtain a secular divorce. Private mediation initiatives for families are the norm 
rather than the exception. 
 
In South Africa this role is fulfilled by unofficial religious and/or secular institutions. 
FAMSA (Families South Africa) is an example of a secular non-profit organisation 
with more than thirty offices across the country. They are engaged in family 
mediation and are committed to "rendering services to all persons irrespective of 
race, culture, gender, social-economic background, religion, education, social or 
political affiliation".64 
 
Focusing on a postcolonial country, namely Botswana, Anne Griffiths65 empirically 
investigates the "shifting norms that have brought about women having greater 
access to resources and property"66 and illustrates how societal changes have 
brought about a change to the customary law of succession to include women who 
have previously been excluded from succession to property. Her ethnological 
                                        
63  Jhutti-Johal "How Parties to Sikh Marriages Use and are Influenced by the Norms" 203-219. 
64  See for example the mission statement of the Potchefstroom branch at FAMSA Potchefstroom 
date unknown http://www.famsapotch.org.za/about.htm. 
65  Griffiths "Managing Expectations" 221-246. 
66  Griffiths "Managing Expectations" 222. 
C RAUTENBACH   PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
 
 
538 
approach to matters of law provides us with valuable information and insight into 
socio-legal realities and should be followed in other pluralistic post-colonial countries 
where customary law exists alongside the mainstream legal system. 
 
Recently the High Court of Botswana in Mmusi v Ramantele67 declared the 
Ngwaketse customary rule of male primogeniture to be unconstitutional and invalid. 
The outcome of the case was hailed as a victory for women’s rights under customary 
law but the respondent appealed the decision.68 The outcome of the case is in line 
with the well-known decision of the South African Constitutional Court case, Bhe v 
Magistrate, Khayelitsha, (Commission For Gender Equality As Amicus Curiae); Shibi v 
Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v President of the Republic of 
South Africa,69 which held that the customary rule of male primogeniture was 
unconstitutional and invalid. In order to fill the void left by the order of invalidity, the 
court ordered that the Intestate Succession Act be applied to all customary law 
estates, thus effectively replacing the customary law of intestate succession with the 
rules of the common law of intestate succession, a system of devolution alien to 
customary law families. The judgment was supplemented on 20 September 2010 by 
the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act,70 
which confirms that the Intestate Succession Act, with certain modifications, must be 
applied to all intestate estates of persons living under a system of customary law.71 
 
                                        
67  Mmusi v Ramantele unreported case number MAHLB-000836-10 of 12 October 2012. In this case 
four women challenged the Ngwaketse customary law rule which allows for the youngest son to 
inherit the family home, on the basis that the rule infringed their constitutional right to equality. 
The court agreed and overturned the ruling of the customary court, which had found in favour of 
the eldest son. 
68  The decision of the Appeal Court is expected at the end of 2013. For more information, see 
Southern Africa Litigation Centre date unknown 
http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/cases/ongoing-cases/mmusi-and-another-v-
ramantele-and-another/. 
69  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, (Commission For Gender Equality As Amicus Curiae); Shibi v 
Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v President of the Republic of South Africa 
2005 1 SA 580 (CC). For a discussion of the case, see Rautenbach 2005 AFLA Quarterly 30-32; 
Himonga 2005 Acta Juridica 82-107; Knoetze and Olivier 2005 Obiter 126-132; Rautenbach, Du 
Plessis and Pienaar 2006 SAJHR 99-118. 
70  Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. 
71  The application of two acts, one based on common law principles and another on customary law 
principles is not without its difficulties. See for example, Rautenbach and Meyer 2012 TSAR 149-
160. 
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Nazila Ghanea72 discusses examples of notable changes in Iranian family law as a 
result of female activism. However, the few developments that have taken place 
over the last few years are in danger of regressing again as a result of the influence 
on state policy of powerful and repressive elite groups. 
 
Farah Deeba Chowdhury73 illustrates how civil society in Bangladesh is resisting 
secular changes imposed by the state, in favour of Muslim law. She draws the 
conclusion that although there are instances of gender discrimination in Bangladesh, 
any reforms will be accepted only if they occur within an Islamic framework. The 
reason for this is the composition of the Bangladeshi people; they are predominantly 
Muslim and will thus resist a secular approach to a large extent.74 
 
In South Africa the introduction of a Uniform Family Code, as proposed by some 
female scholars in India,75 is equally problematic but for reasons other than those in 
India. In India objections are raised against such a code because of its secular 
nature. In South Africa, as the Muslim Marriages Bill has proven, the problems seem 
to stem from the various Muslim groups which cannot reach consensus about what 
should be in the code and what not.76 
 
Non-state responses to diversity in societies, especially where their actions overlap 
and come in conflict with those of state institutions, remain controversial and 
problematic. However, sitting on the fence should not be an alternative to dealing 
with the issues head-on; especially when the rights of vulnerable groups and 
individuals come into play. 
 
                                        
72  Ghanea "Rights, Women and Human Rights Change in Iran" 247-261. 
73  Chowdhury "Muslim Family Law in Bangladesh" 263-269. 
74  Attempts in India to introduce a Uniform Civil Code for family law have failed. See for example, 
the discussion of Rautenbach 2006 CILSA 241-264. 
75  Chowdhury "Muslim Family Law in Bangladesh" 263. 
76  Amien "Gendered Benefits and Costs" 109. 
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4 How much law is enough? 
 
The discussion so far has revealed that legal regulation is not always the answer but 
needed in some cases. The question is thus how much family conduct needs to be 
regulated by the law? In other words, what should be kept in the family and what 
should be regulated by the state? 
 
Jordi Ribot77 echoes Eekelaar's sentiments when he says that the involvement of the 
state in family law should be limited, especially in the case of cultural and religious 
minorities "who are willing to settle conflicts arising in family matters according to 
their non-state ethnic, cultural or religious norms".78 I have already voiced my 
concerns with such an approach, especially with regard to the position of vulnerable 
groups such as women and children within those minority groups. It seems that 
Ribot is well aware of the dangers such an approach might have for individual 
human rights79 but he nevertheless proposes a hybrid approach involving both the 
law and social practices which will not "jeopardise individual self-determination or 
result in gender-discrimination".80 
 
The similarity between the approach he proposes and that taken in section 31 of the 
South African Constitution81 is noticeable. Section 31 provides as follows: 
 
(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be 
denied the right, with other members of that community-  
(a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and  
(b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and 
other organs of civil society.  
(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with 
any provision of the Bill of Rights. 
 
Religious and cultural groups may thus continue with their social practices as long as 
they do not infringe anyone's rights. Additionally, the wide range of the South 
                                        
77  Ribot "How much Family Conduct do we Need to Regulate" 273-294. 
78  Ribot "How much Family Conduct do we Need to Regulate" 274. 
79  Ribot "How much Family Conduct do we Need to Regulate" 289. 
80  Ribot "How much Family Conduct do we Need to Regulate" 290. 
81  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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African Constitution makes it possible to protect individual family members against 
any harmful or discriminatory family conduct, because the Constitution is supreme 
law and invalidates "law and conduct" inconsistent with it.82 A number of South 
African judgments are testament to the fact that the judiciary would not hesitate to 
involve themselves in unofficial family laws if they think an individual or individuals 
are in need of their protection.83 
 
Marjorie Smith and Ann Phoenix84 discuss the controversial issue of the corporal 
punishment of children by their parents and come to the conclusion that a variety of 
complex norms are at play for which no uniform response in law exists or should 
exist. The complexities of the normative issues seem to have been one of the main 
reasons why the South African government has not yet been able to abolish corporal 
punishment within the privacy of a family home. 
 
Generally, corporal punishment is a culturally and legally acceptable form of 
punishment for children in South Africa. The common law defence of reasonable and 
moderate chastisement keeps the parents out of trouble in most cases.85 Attempts 
made over the last few years to criminalise the corporal punishment of one's own 
children have been met with fierce resistance by some parents, and the drive to 
include a prevention clause in the Children's Act86 was eventually abandoned to 
prevent the Act from following its logical course.87 The position is thus that parents 
may still apply "moderate and reasonable" corporal punishment to their children until 
a court of law dictates otherwise, or the legislature steps in with alternative 
measures. Corporal punishment was socially accepted for many years in South 
African schools but was abolished in the South African Schools Act.88 A group of 
                                        
82  S 2 of the Constitution. 
83  See for example the cases discussed in Rautenbach 2010 J Legal Plur 143-178. 
84  Smith and Phoenix "Variation and Change in Normative Parental Discipline" 295-312. 
85  The first decision in a long line of decisions confirming this defence was Rex v Janke and Janke 
1913 TPD 382, where the court held that it may be necessary to correct what is evil in a child by 
means of moderate and reasonable corporal punishment. 
86  Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
87  Bower Banning Corporal Punishment 10. 
88  South African Schools Act 84 of 1996. S 10 prevents the corporal punishment of learners at 
schools. 
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Christian parents that regarded the application of corporal punishment in Christian 
schools as culturally acceptable and even necessary contested the validity of the 
specific provision unsuccessfully in the Constitutional Court in Christian Education 
South Africa v Minister of Education89 but their application failed and the court found 
that South Africa was internationally and constitutionally obliged not to subject 
children in schools to violence and degrading punishment. 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
 
The 2005 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity regards culture "as the 
set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a 
social group ... that encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of 
living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs",90 and demands the following 
commitment from states:91 
 
In our increasingly diverse societies, it is essential to ensure harmonious interaction 
among people and groups with plural, varied and dynamic cultural identities as well 
as their willingness to live together. Policies for the inclusion and participation of all 
citizens are guarantees of social cohesion, the vitality of civil society and peace. 
Thus defined, cultural pluralism gives policy expression to the reality of cultural 
diversity. Indissociable from a democratic framework, cultural pluralism is 
conducive to cultural exchange and to the flourishing of creative capacities that 
sustain public life. 
 
This note reviews a couple of responses the law has or should have to families with 
different "lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs" in 
a variety of legal systems. It is evident from the discussions that family diversity 
issues are not unique but are shared by many jurisdictions. The only difference is 
the way the jurisdictions deal with the issue. 
 
The viewpoints of the authors referred to in this note contribute to a greater 
awareness of the challenges family diversity brings to the fore, and sets out what 
                                        
89  Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC). 
90  Preamble of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2005). 
91  A 2 of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2005). 
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the book proposes to do, namely not "to propose a single definite strategy that 
should be adopted" to deal with family diversity, but to provide "material on which 
researchers, advocates and policy makers can draw in furthering their understanding 
of and seeking solutions to the problems raised by this significant social 
development".92 
 
Any scholarly publication dealing with cultural and religious diversity contributes to 
our understanding of the modern-day impact of diversity and the demands such 
diversity makes on contemporary governments and its people. 
                                        
92  See Maclean and Eekelaar Managing Family Diversity preface. 
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